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Public Law 101-510, Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DA WIA) became effective upon its passage for Fiscal Year 1992. The intent of the 
legislation is to increase the training and professionalism of the Department of 
Defense Acquisition Workforce. The DA WIA outlines specific requirements and 
qualifications for various specialties within the General Series (GS) workforce and 
states requirements for the qualifications of military personnel who are filling 
acquisition billets. 
This thesis will focus on the Marine Officers currently working in the 
acquisition workforce. It will look at how they are accessed and trained within the 
workforce. It will also look at current career progression and makes 
recommendations as to how the current acquisition workforce structure should be 
modified in order to remain viable well into the next century. 
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Clearly within the Department of Defense (DOD), concerted efforts have been 
made to develop a professionalized cadre of officers whose mission in the broadest 
sense is to organize, equip, train and direct military forces. While the acquisition of 
the weapon systems and other equipment and material required by the military in 
performing this mission is a critical link in the performance of this defense mission, 
there has been far less emphasis placed on developing a high quality, professionalized 
acquisition workforce (A WF). 
The great majority of efforts to improve the acquisition system over the past 
20 years have been focused on changes in acquisition policies, procedures and 
processes. These have included acquisition techniques such as Total Package 
Procurement, Design-to-Cost, emphasis on various contract types and the use of 
multi-year contracting. Major efforts at legislative changes include the Competition 
In Contracting Act, the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984 and the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act, as well as other provisions routinely included in yearly 
Defense Authorization Acts. 
There have been fewer efforts to improve the management and organizational 
structure of the acquisition system, with even less attention focused on the workforce. 
The most notable efforts in this area prior to the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DA WIA) were the Packard Commission's recommendations to 
streamline the acquisition organizational structure in 1986. 
Any professional organization requires qualified, trained and properly 
motivated personnel to achieve the organization's missions and goals. Although good 
people can get the job done even in the wrong organizational structure, the wrong 
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people (unqualified, poorly trained and lacking motivation) cannot accomplish the 
mission even in the best organizational setting. Why then have there been so few 
reform efforts directed towards improvements in the quality of acquisition personnel? 
Lack of reform initiatives however, does not mean that there has been a lack 
of concern in this area. In the case of the A WF within DOD, it has been recognized 
for nearly 25 years, both within and outside Government, that the quality and 
professionalism of this workforce must be improved. 
The importance of this issue was best described in the Fitzhugh Commission 
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel report of July 1, 1970 when it.postulated that: 
The key determinants of the ultimate effectiveness and efficiency of the 
defense procurement process are the procurement personnel who have 
the challenging responsibility for interpreting and applying the 
regulations ... the importance of this truism has not been appropriately 
reflected in the recruitment, career development, training and manage-
ment of the procurement workforce. As a consequence, the Department 
is faced with a significant number of immediate and future problems 
with respect to the availability in adequate numbers of appropriately 
qualified and capable procurement personnel. [Ref. 1 :p. 94] 
Sixteen years later, the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 
chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, noted that the 
Defense Department "must be able to attract and retain the caliber of people necessary 
for a quality acquisition program." [Ref. 2:p. 16] Most recently, former Presidents 
Carter and Ford advised the Bush administration that: 
With experienced, competent civil servants and political appointees 
Defense Department acquisition can be managed successfully. Without 
them no organizational policy changes are going to make any 
substantial difference in DOD management.... The single most likely 
way to produce further waste in DOD and further procurement scandals 
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is to discourage public service by the competent, to take no steps to 
improve the quality of the career civilian managers, and to appoint to 
important positions in DOD those who have little or no relevant 
knowledge of, or experience in, defense type acquisition. [Ref. 3:p. 16] 
In addition to the Fitzhugh and Packard Commissions, four additional 
commissions since 1945 have reviewed the acquisition workforce within DOD. The 
First and Second Hoover Commissions in 1949 and 1955, the Commission on 
Government Procurement in 1972 and the Grace Commission in 1983. All of the 
studies observed the necessity to improve the quality and professionalism of DOD 
acquisition personnel. In addition there have been numerous studies and reports from 
various other sources, such as the General Accounting Office, the Rand Corporation, 
internal DOD studies and academia. 
In critiquing various aspects of the DOD acquisition process, many of these 
reports cited the need to improve personnel management of the A WF. For example, 
J. Ronald Fox, a Harvard bus!ness professor, observed in 1974 that: 
... the most far-reaching reform would be the establishment of a clearly 
defined procurement career field within the military, with senior 
procurement managers controlling assignments and promotions. Any-
thing short of this will not resolve the continuous crisis in procurement 
management. [Ref. 4:p. 201] 
However, writing 18 years later Fox observed that efforts to establish military career 
programs for program managers (PMs) and procurement personnel had been resisted: 
... by senior officers in personnel and combat arms units, who were 
unconvinced of the need for a highly skilled and stable professional 
force to manage the acquisition process. Senior combat arms officers 
(who control military assignments and promotions) were also 
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concerned that they would loose some of their most able officers to 
acquisition careers if they lost control of the assignment and promotion 
process. [Ref. S:p. 190] 
It seems from Fox's point of view that all of the panels, commissions, studies 
and bodies of legislation prior to 1988 have had little positive effect on the 
management of the military officers within the DOD A WF. 
In 1991, DAWIA was passed by both chambers of Congress and signed into 
law. It is the most recent attempt at legislating an increase in the training and 
professionalization of the military and civilians within the DOD AWF. The Marine 
Corps, as part of DOD, is currently facing a real challenge in accessing, training and 
developing its military officers in the wake of this highly structured and directive 
legislation. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this research is to examine the current topical issues 
that impact and effect the management of the military officers comprising the Marine 
Corps Acquisition Workforce. It will concentrate specifically on the accession, 
training and professional development policies currently in use by DOD and 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). It will attempt to determine whar, if any, 
changes need to be made to insure that the A WF can meet the challenges that it will 
face in the 21st century. 
The ultimate goal of this research is the creation of a plan that includes a 
validation of the current career pattern for Marine acquisition officers, or suggests a 
revised career track that will be useful to the Commanding General, Marine Corps 
Systems Command (COMMARCORSYSCOM) as she continues to oversee the 
professional development and DA WIA mandated requirements of Marine acquisition 
officers. 
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C. RESEARCH METHOD 
The following primary research question will be used to direct and guide the 
objectives ofthis study: 
How can the Marine Corps Acquisition Workforce best be directed to 
ensure a sufficient number of Marine officers are accessed, trained and 
gain the experience necessary to staff the Marine Corps' critical acquisi-
tion positions? 
This primary research question can be divided into a number of subsidiary 
research questions to make the investigation more manageable. The following 
subsidiary questions will be used in this study: 
1. What are the legal statutes and regulations that govern the framework 
of the Marine Corps Acquisition Workforce? 
2. How does the Marine Corps currently access officers into the A WF? 
3. What are the educational requirements for the A WF and how are the 
continuing educational requirements being met for acquisition officers? 
4. Are there DOD or Marine Corps educational programs that can be 
utilized to incentivize participation in the A WF? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of this thesis is restricted to the military officers within the Marine 
Corps Acquisition Workforce. Although the civilian members of the force are an 
integral part of the acquisition process, they are not included in this study. Currently, 
civilian workers fil143 percent of the 1,295 designated acquisition billets within the 
Marine Corps [Ref. 6:p. 1]. They are the permanent technical backbone of the force. 
Unlike military officers, they tend to remain in their positions for many years at a time 
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and are subject to a much different set of career considerations than military officers. 
Additionally, being more stable in their billets, they are usually available for 
assignments to professional education courses throughout their careers, whereas 
military officers are generally only available for acquisition related professional 
education while assigned to an acquisition billet. These differing factors would 
invalidate any conclusions that would be drawn on the Marine Corps Acquisition 
Workforce as a single population. 
Additionally, the study does not include the approximately 100 enlisted 
members of the workforce [Ref. 7:p. 4]. The majority ofthe members ofthe enlisted 
workforce are assigned the Marine Corps military occupational specialty (MOS) 
3044. These Marines are classified as Purchasing and Contracting Specialists and 
perform various duties incident to the acquisition of supplies and nonpersonal services 
purchased via open market from commercial and Government sources [Ref. 8:pp. 
3-171]. Because this segment of the A WF deals primarily with small purchases, 
career paths and acquisition related educational requirements although important, ate 
not analogous to that of the officer corps. Their unique requirements have already 
been the topic of a comprehensive study conducted by Major Roy R. Schleiden, 
USMC [Ref. 9]. 
Several assumptions were made in this study. The first is that the Marine 
·Corps is committed to maintaining its own military A WF. A corollary to this 
assumption is that the Marine Corps will do whatever is reasonably necessary and 
required by statute to encourage the professionalization of any and all officers 
volunteering for the workforce. They will do this in order to create a more efficient 
and responsive procurement system. This assumption does not mean to suggest that 
the Corps has not made a concerted effort in this area in the past. Quite the contrary, 
the Marine Corps has demonstrated not only a sincere desire to comply with the letter 
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and intent of the law, but has continued full-fledged support of the entire acquisition 
process. The recently appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General 
Charles Krulak, reaffirmed the Corps' commitment to acquisition by making it one of 
the planks in the Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) which is his roadmap for 
the service that states "where the Marine Corps is going and why," and "what the 
Marine Corps will do," in the four years of his tenancy and beyond [Ref. 10:p. 1]. 
The second assumption is that the Marine Corps desires to have all officers in 
the A WF remain fully capable and credible in their primary MOS. A primary MOS 
is defined as an MOS that is assigned upon initial accession into the Marine Corps 
and involves duties in combat arms and direct support functions. Participation in the 
A WF is currently labeled a secondary duty and is identified as such in the MOS 
system. The Marine Corps strongly believes that Marines assigned to acquisition 
tours immediately after completing a successful tour in their primary MOS bring with 
them a wealth of hands on experience along with the knowledge of what the Marines 
in the field require from their equipment. This is a cornerstone of the Corps' 
acquisition process because it ensures that the acquisition cycle is responsive to the 
needs of the Marine Forces [Ref. 11]. 
The third and final assumption is that any recommended changes to the current 
accession, training and professional development policies used to shape the A WF 
involve a bare minimum of increases in Marine officers in the training transient 
patient and prisoner (T2P2) categories or fiscal requirements. The T2P2 category is 
used to identify officers that are not currently available for Fleet Marine Force (FMF) 
assignments because they are attending training schools, a hospital patient, moving 
between assignments or detained in military confinement. In the fiscal arena, the 
Marine Corps, being the smallest of the four Armed Services, can least afford to have 
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a large investment in the numbers of officers devoted to a dedicated training cycle for 
acquisition related educational requirements. 
There were no major limitations that were encountered while conducting this 
study. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used by the researcher consisted of two basic procedures, the 
first being a review of the pertinent literature and the second being the use of personal 
interviews to elicit information on questions produced by the literature review. 
The comprehensive review of relevant outstanding literature on this thesis 
topic consisted of obtaining reports held by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces (ICAF), the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) and 
the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), as well as applicable professional 
journals. There was also a large body of information available from numerous 
documents on this subject internal to the Marine Corps. 
Personal interviews were conducted at HQMC and the Marine Corps Systems 
Command (MARCORSYSCOM) during the period 7-11 August 1995. The 
Commander of the MARCORSYSCOM (COMMARCORSYSCOM), Major General 
Carol Mutter, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (DC/S AIR), Lieutenant 
General Harold Blot, both submitted to extensive information gathering sessions that 
provide great insight into the current state of the Marine Corps Military A WF and 
their visions for the future. Additionally, the Director of Acquisition Workforce 
Management for the Marine Corps, Mr. J. L. Crevillo arranged for interview periods 
with seven program managers (PMs) currently serving in program management (PM) 
billets within the Marine Corps. 
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F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This research effort is comprised of six chapters covering the following subject 
areas: 
Chapter I is an introduction providing the rationale and objectives to be 
obtained in this study. 
Chapter II presents background information on the DA WIA implementation 
in general and specifically on how its tenants were adopted into the Marine Corps. 
Chapter III will give a snapshot of the number of acquisition billets identified 
by the Marine Corps, the number of officers available to fill them and the 
interrelationship between the A WF and the Special Education Program (SEP). 
Chapter IV will identify a generic officer's career path, look at the impact of 
imposing acquisition related requirements on the generic career path, and study a 
previous recommendation at developing a career track for Marine acquisition officers. 
Chapter V will analyze the material presented in Chapters III and IV and 
suggest ways of improving the way Marine officers are accessed and trained in the 
AWF. 
Chapter VI will summarize the findings of the previous chapters and present 




A. ACQUISITION REFORM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
11 Frankly, gentlemen, in defense procurement, we have a real mess on our 
hands. 11 
The Honorable David Packard 
Deputy Secretary ofDefense, 1970 
[Ref. 4:p. 1] 
From a historical sense, failings of the weapons acquisition process are not 
limited to the past 25 years. They are not even confined to the 20th century. In 
March 1794, Congress authorized the building of six large frigates, which were to 
form the backbone of the U.S. Navy. Nearly 17 months later, six keels were laid. 
Shortly thereafter, due to delays and cost overruns, the program was cut back to just 
three frigates [Ref. 12:p. 18]. 
More recently DOD has been the subject of numerous scandalous newspaper 
articles and 30-second news bites revealing astronomical prices that the Government 
was paying for common hardware items. Clearly, past attempts at acquisition reform 
have not been totally successful. It has almost become a cliche to state that the 
numerous reforms initiated over the years have not had the desired effect and today 
we face the same set of acquisition problems as the founders of the Navy did in 1794. 
Attempts at reforming the procurement process have not been unsuccessful 
because their intent has not been clear or focused. Each attempt at acquisition reform 
has been specifically aimed at correcting long-standing deficiencies in the acquisition 
system, including improving the quality of the A WF. 
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1. Early Attempts at A WF Improvement 
Some of the earliest recommendations for changes in the A WF in the 20th 
century can be traced to the First and Second Hoover Commissions of 1949 and 1955 
respectively. 
The First Hoover Commission was created by a unanimous vote of Congress 
in July 1947. The Commission was bipartisan with six members from each party. 
Four Commissioners each were chosen by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives and President Truman. 
The Commission was tasked with a general review of the functioning of the 
Executive Branch of Government and attempted to identity "duplication, overlapping 
and administrative turmoil" within that branch of Government [Ref. 13:p: vi]. This 
was an enormous undertaking. The Commission divided its work into functional and 
departmental segments. It created 24 separate task forces with broad authority to 
engage in as much research as they might require. In general the Commission found 
that the United States was paying a heavy price for a lack of order, a lack of clear 
lines of authority and responsibility and a general lack of organization in the 
executive branch. It found that great improvements could be made in the effective-
ness with which the Government can serve the people if its organization and 
administration are overhauled. 
The Commission specifically addressed the deficiencies in supply administra-
tion and in the personnel assigned to the A WF, or "supply positions" as they were 
called in that era. The Commissioners stated that a: 
Failure is reflected further in the personnel system which does not 
provide competent staff to fill supply positions. Although purchasing 
is a highly skilled profession that requires intimate knowledge of the 
conditions ... personnel processes fail to make proper acknowledgment 
ofthe skills required. [Ref. 13:p. 96] 
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Additionally they found that the Federal Government needs to develop a: 
Career service which attracts and holds men and women of the highest 
intelligence and whose devotion to duty and whose competence is 
commensurate with the needs of our Government. Any personnel 
practices which do not attain this objective must be condemned. In 
their place we must substitute methods which will achieve such an 
objective. Unless this goal is attained we cannot expect sound, 
efficient, and economical Government. [Ref. 13:p. 110] 
The Second Hoover Commission went into much greater detail on military 
procurement issues. The commission devoted an entire task force to this subject. In 
their final report, the Commissioners concluded that there was a wealth of talent and 
ability in the military departments that was only being partially used in the procure-
men arena for four primary reasons. The stated reasons were: 
1. Requiring those who achieve top military rank to become well rounded 
in all military fields, with predominant emphasis on combat command 
skills; 
2. Rotating key logistics personnel from assignments prior to the arrival 
and indoctrination of qualified replacements; 
3. Assigning senior officers with limited logistics training to key logistics 
positions; and 
4. Depriving civilians of access to many key logistics positions of 
predominately business management character, on the grounds that 
such positions must be reserved for the training of military executives 
or that backgrounds in military operations is a prerequisite. [Ref. 14:p. 
68] 
The Commission felt so strongly on this matter that in their final report to 
President Eisenhower they made an official recommendation that: 
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The Secretary of Defense should establish a policy requiring each 
military department to develop and assign career-trained personnel to 
technical and executive posts throughout the field of procurement 
management. [Ref. 14:p. 68] 
The Commission felt that the need for this management policy should be 
apparent and wondered why DOD was not already pursuing a similar policy on their 
own. They noted that at many of the largest logistical installations, it was not unusual 
to find that the officer in charge and his key assistants came to their assignments 
without adequate experience in the function in which they were to manage. They 
recommended to President Eisenhower that the implementation to the proposed policy 
should include the following three steps. 
1. Departmental school programs should be designed to assure the phased 
training of all career procurement employees not adequately qualified 
[Ref. 14:p. 68]. 
2. The positions of material manager, commanding officer of a logistical 
headquarters or installation and all technical or supervisory positions 
at any nontactical headquarters or installation should be filled only with 
qualified career-trained personnel. In this connection it is recognized 
that there is a necessary and proper place for combat officers in logis-
tical activities and for logistical officers in combat activities as staff 
assistants and advisors. Combat officers who are transferred to support 
activities should, of course, be required to qualify for technical and 
executive posts through proper training and experience [Ref. 14:p. 68]. 
3. Qualified civilians should be given the logistical training made avail-
able to military personnel, and an opportunity to advance into all 
responsible positions except those where the requirement for military 
command is essential. [Ref. 14:p. 68] 
The Hoover Commission Reports are only the tip of the proverbial iceberg 
when it comes to recommendations on changes for the procurement system in general 
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and specifically the A WF. In each of the decades since the 1940's there has been 
some sort of study or major commission report that addressed these issues. Figure 2.1 
provides a consolidated time line of these studies. 
The next report that had a considerable impact on procurement practices was 
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970. 
2. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel 
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by President Nixon in July 
1969. It consisted of prominent members of the educational and business commun-
ities and contained no elected Government officials. It was chaired by Gilbert W. 
Fitzhugh who at the time was also the Chairman of the Board for Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company. The Commission subsequently became known as the Fitzhugh 
Commission. 
Fitzhugh's charter was much the same as the Hoover Commission's 20 years 
prior. His panel was charged with studying the organization and management of 
DOD. This time however !he scope was to specifically include "the Defense 
procurement policies and practices, particularly as they relate to costs, time and 
quality" [Ref. 1 :p. v]. 
The panel interviewed many witnesses in depth and conducted a survey of 
DOD organizations in the Washington area. It also sent a questionnaire to a large 
number of people outside DOD who they felt were knowledgeable in the subject area. 
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£. The Defense Acquisition Workforce 
if Improvement Act (1991) 
Not surprisingly, they found many of the same deficiencies that the Hoover 
Commissions had identified two decades earlier. They found that: 
The promotion and rotation systems of the Military Services do not 
facilitate career development in the technical and professional 
activities, such as research and development, procurement, intelligence, 
communications and automatic data processing [Ref. 1 :p. 2]. 
Additionally, they found that: 
Program Management assignments have not generally been recognized 
as having good potential for career development for military officers. 
Program management is not effectively a career service for military 
officers, although military officers act as Program Managers on a 
majority of developments, and are almost always designated as 
Program Managers for major systems. These officers have traditionally 
been rotated on normal tours of duty (2-4 years) among a variety of 
types of jobs. Although they usually bring to the Program Manager 
assignment knowledge of the operational use of the type of system 
involved in the development, they often have a minimum of training 
and experience in business management; yet they are faced with the 
task of negotiating with and monitoring the efforts of industrial 
organizations which bring to the problem talented, technical and 
management personnel with extensive continuity and experience in the 
particular type of activity encompassed in the development. In 
addition, Program Managers have been often rotated, based on time in 
their careers, at critical points in the development of the programs and 
frequently with no overlap for training their successor. [Ref. 1 :p. 79] 
They also severely criticized DOD for showing: 
No indication of consistent efforts by the Services to select Program 
Managers from among those officers who have the most promising 
potential. Ideally, a Program Manager should possess both managerial 
and technical skills and experience in the operational employment of 
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the type of system, weapon or other hardware under development. 
[Ref. 1 :p. 80] 
Based on these findings the Fitzhugh Commission recommended to President 
Nixon in its final report that DOD: 
Establish a career specialty code for Program Managers in each 
Military Service and develop selection and training criteria that will 
ensure the availability of an adequate number of qualified officers. The 
criteria should emphasize achieving a reasonable balance between the 
needs for knowledge of operational requirements and experience in 
management [Ref. 1 :p. 8]. 
It appears from these reports that despite a conscientious effort by many 
different distinguished sources and Presidential administrations that very little 
substantive change has occurred within the A WF since the First Hoover Commission 
Report in 1949. This pattern of inaction would change for the better in the 1980's. 
-3. The 1980's: A Prelude to DA WIA 
In July 1985, Ronald Reagan tasked his own Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management, more commonly known as the Packard Commission, to: 
Study the issues surrounding defense management policies and proce-
dures, including the budget process, the procurement system, legislative 
oversight, and the organizational and operational arrangements, both 
formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified 
Command system, the Military Departments, and the Congress. [Ref. 
2:p. 27] . 
The Commission was not specifically tasked with studying the A WF. 
However, it identified numerous deficiencies in the procurement system that 
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prevented the A WF from accomplishing its mission. Some of these deficiencies were 
diagnosed as being subject to inflexible acquisition procedures, regulations and laws, 
lacking individual authority to control programs and being subject to never-ending 
bureaucratic obligations for making reports [Ref. 16:pp. 13-14]. Rather than faulting 
the personnel involved in the acquisition process, the Commission took issue with the 
process that the workforce members had to work within. The Commission even took 
issue with the Congress when it said: 
Chances for meaningful improvement will come not from more 
regulation but only with major institutional change. Common sense 
must be made to prevail alike in the enactments of Congress and the 
operations of the Department. We must give acquisition personnel 
more authority to do their jobs. If we make it possible for people to do 
the right thing the first time and allow them to use their common sense, 
then we believe that the Department can get by with far fewer people. 
[Ref. 16:p. 13] 
Based on their study the Commission recommended to the President that he 
establish unambiguous authority for overall acquisition policy and clear account-
ability for acquisition execution along with the "establishment of business-related 
education and experience criteria ... which will provide a basis for the professionalism 
of their career paths" [Ref. 16:p. 16]. 
In his address to Congress on April 24, 1986, President Reagan made it 
absolutely clear that the time for change was at hand and that the powers to make that 
change lie within his office and the Congress of the United States when he said: 
The Packard Commission has charted a three-part course for improving 
our nation's defense establishment. I have already directed implemen-
tation of its recommendations where that can be accomplished through 
Executive action. In this message, I ask that the Congress enact certain 
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changes in law that will further improve the organization and operation 
of the Department of Defense. Now, the remaining requirement for 
reform lies within the Congress itself. [Ref. 2:p. 49] 
The stage was now set for Congress to take proper actions to ensure that the 
deficiencies in the A WF that had been pointed out over the previous 40 years were 
rectified, but before they took legislative action they decided to conduct a review of 
their own. 
The Congress tasked the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) to 
conduct its own study of the A WF. The purpose of the report can be summarized in 
the following excerpt from the final report. 
It is clear ... that there is no lack of statutory, executive order and outside 
expert identification of problems and recommended changes that 
should be pursued to improve the quality and professionalism of the 
A WF. Yet despite these continued calls for improvement and the 
obvious changes made in the recent past, few are convinced that 
enough has been done. New and varied proposals to change the 
organization or character of the acquisition workforce have been 
espoused with increasing efficiency. 
Before considering the adoption of any of these proposals, the 
Committee on Armed Services believed that it was crucial to conduct 
an in-depth analysis of the state of the A WF and any trends that may be 
evident. Without such an assessment it is virtually impossible to 
determine cause and effect -- hence to determine with any certainty that 
proposed solutions to this problem will bring about the desired result. 
Thus, the objective of this report is to assess the qualifications and 
professionalism of the acquisition workforce -- both present and past, 
military and civilian; to review the efforts of the Department ofDefense 
and the Military Departments to establish and manage the career 
development of that workforce; and, where appropriate, provide 
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recommendations for improving the quality and professionalism of that 
workforce. [Ref. 17:p. 65] 
This was truly an in-depth study of the A WF and left no stone untumed. It was 
both qualitative and quantitative in nature. It looked at the levels of education, length 
of employment, experience levels and the training received by the members of this 
group. It concluded that the basic postulates of the previous studies and commissions 
were indeed correct and that major changes would be beneficial to the efficiency and 
morale of the workforce. 
Equipped with their own conclusive study that showed that change was long 
overdue, the recommendations of the Packard Commission and the body of 
knowledge on this subject that had accumulated over the past 40 years, Congress 
enacted the first concise body of legislation designed to enhance the professional-
ization ofthe AWF. 
B. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT ACT 
On November 5, 1990, Congress passed Public Law 101-510 that since 
enactment has become commonly known as the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DA WIA). Its enactment has had far reaching effects on the 
members of the A WF. 
1. Creating the Acquisition Corps 
DAWIA directed the Secretary of Defense to create a formal Acquisition 
Corps. The legislation allows each of the Military Departments to form its own 
acquisition corps and makes a specific allowance for the Marine Corps to do the 
same. It charges the Secretary of Defense with ensuring to the maximum extent 
practicable, that the polices and procedures provided in DA WIA are implemented in 
a uniform manner within DOD. 
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Initially each Service was tasked with identifYing the billets they deemed to be 
acquisition positions. In order to be classified as an acquisition position, the 
personnel assigned to these billets should be materially involved in the planning, 
design, development, testing, contracting, production, introduction, acquisition 
logistics support and disposal of systems, equipment, facilities, supplies or services 
that are intended for use in or the support of military missions. 
Once these positions were identified they were categorized into one of the 
areas listed below based on the type of work that was predominately performed in that 
billet. The acquisition position categories (PO SCAT) used were: 
Program Management 
Systems Planning, Research, Development, Engineering and Testing 
Contracting 
Industrial Property Management 
Logistics 
Quality Assurance 
Manufacturing and Production 
Business, Cost Estimating, Financial Management and Auditing 
Education, Training and Career Development 
Construction 
Joint Development 
[Ref. 18:p. 210] 
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After categorizing all of the positions in the A WF, each position category was 
divided into three career levels for purposes of establishing standards and 
qualifications: basic, also known as developmental acquisition positions (Level I, 
officer grade 0-1 thru 0-3); intermediate (Level II, 0-4); and senior (Level III, 0-5 
and above). Levels II and above were then designated the Acquisition Corps as the 
personnel assigned to these billets are the trained professional nucleus of the A WF. 
Additionally, the Level III billets were designated as being the Critical 
Acquisition Positions within the Acquisition Corps. They were deemed critical by 
virtue of their importance to the acquisition process. DA WIA mandates that all 
positions held by Lieutenant Colonels (0-5) and above be so designated. 
Additionally, certain positions such as PMs and deputy PMs, of all major defense 
acquisition programs and any other acquisition positions of significant responsibility, 
in which primary duties are supervisory or management would be designated as 
critical if held by a major or 0-4. The Services are required annually to publish a list 
of those positions it designates as critical billets. The primary reason for the critical 
designation is to preclude individuals without the appropriate experience from being 
placed into positions for which they are not adequately prepared. 
At this point it is important to note that the terms acquisition workforce and 
acquisition corps are not synomous. The A WF in general is the personnel component 
of the acquisition system. The A WF includes personnel who are currently members 
of the acquisition corps or who are in developmental acquisition positions. The 
acquisition corps excludes the developmental acquisition positions. This relationship 
is portrayed in Figure 2.2. 
DA WIA attempts to place the required emphasis on the training and 
experience necessary for the individuals selected to serve in the acquisition corps to 
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Figure 2.2. Acquisition Personnel Model 
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is the building block approach. As military officers grow through promotion within 
their acquisition career, they are held to an increasingly higher standard at each level. 
The goal of DA WIA is to increase continuously military officers' professionalism 
at each step of their careers. The hope is that through initial training in acquisition 
a "tool box" will be built when an officer enters the workforce. The tool box will 
continue to build with time, training and education. Ultimately, the instruments will 
become more precise and so will the officer's ability to affect the acquisition process. 
Thus a professional corps will continue to be nurtured, and a select few will be 
prepared to fill the top positions within the acquisition corp,s. 
2. Professionalizing the Acquisition Corps 
DA WIA mandated that the Acquisition Corps increase its level of profes-
sionalism. It did this by setting minimum standards in three areas. The first area set 
minimum education and training requirements. 
In order for a military officer to qualify as a member of the acquisition corps, 
the officer must volunteer and be selected by the individual Service's Acquisition 
Career Program Board which is tasked with managing the accession, training, 
education and career development of personnel in the A WF. 
The legislation provides specific selection criteria to be used by the board. To 
qualify, the officer is required to have completed at least 24 semester credit hours in 
business, finance, qualitative methods or management related subjects; have at least 
four years of experience in an acquisition position; and, as a minimum, have attained 
the level of Major ( 0-4) as a military officer. Additionally, each POSCAT has its 
own unique set of minimum training requirements that must be met at each of the 
levels within the POSCAT. 
The legislation does have provisions for waiver authority for standards 
established for acquisition corps members. The DA WIA requirements do not apply 
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to any officers with over ten years of acquisition experience, nor do they apply to 
someone currently in acquisition with less than ten years experience, if the officer has 
passed an exam considered by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology (USD(A&T)) to demonstrate skills, knowledge or abilities comparable 
to those of an individual who has completed at least 24 semester hours of business, 
finance, qualitative methods or management related courses. 
The second area mandates minimum military grade requirements. This is 
apparent by the way career levels were tied to military rank. It recognizes the fact 
that as military officers rise in rank their capabilities to accept greater responsibilities 
increase. It also capitalizes on the officer's time in Service. Having more time in 
Service when assigned to the acquisition corps or even a critical acquisition billet 
means that officers would have had enough time to build on experiences in the field 
and bring those experiences back to the project they are leading. 
The third area provides for professionalization through experience require-
ments. DA WIA in general sets four years of experience in an acquisition position as 
the minimum necessary within DOD. It emphasizes the tool box approach in that it 
requires increasing amounts of experience as the individual progresses through the 
levels of the acquisition corps so that by the time an officer progresses to the senior 
positions ofPM and Program Executive Officer (general officer) officers have at least 
eight and ten years of experience respectively. This helps to ensure that only 
qualified and experienced individuals obtain these lofty positions. 
This has been a simplified treatment of the concepts and issues surrounding 
the DA WIA statute. A more detailed explanation has been omitted purposely 
because further specifics are not germain to the discussion or have no direct bearing 
on the implementation ofthe DAWIA requirements within the Marine Corps. The 
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next chapter will discuss how the DA WIA requirements specifically relate to the 
Marine Corps and how the requirements of the statute have been implemented. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF DA WIA'S IMPACT ON THE MARINE CORPS 
A. ACCESSION POLICY ANALYSIS 
The current accession policy and procedures used by the Marine Corps when 
selecting its acquisition officers has been developed using the broad DA WIA 
standards outlined in the previous chapter as a point of reference from which to start. 
These wide guidelines have been brought into clearer focus through implementation 
of DOD Instruction 5000.52-M (DOD 5000.52-M) [Ref. 20] and further refined by 
Secretary ofthe Navy Instruction 5300.36 (SECNAVINST 5300.36) [Ref. 21]. The 
SECNA VINST is the source document that the Navy and Marine Corps utilize in the 
day to day management of the A WF. 
1. The Acquisition Candidate 
The Marines have chosen to identify the members associated with the 
acquisition community by assigning them one of three secondary MOSs [Ref. 21 :p. 
2-IV-6]. The first secondary MOS assigned is 9957 or Acquisition Candidate. This 
MOS is assigned to individuals who have taken steps towards becoming an acquisi-
tion professional and may or may not meet the qualification standards required for 
A WF membership. If qualified for A WF membership, they lack the more stringent 
requirements necessary to become members of the acquisition core or Acquisition 
Professional Community (APC) as it is called within the Department of the Navy 
(DON). Although designation as an Acquisition Candidate can be viewed as an entry 
level qualification, it is not analogous to being Level I certified in a PO SCAT. This 
same logic holds for the 9958, Acquisition Management Officer and 9959, 
Acquisition Manager MOSs and great care should be taken not to associate the 
secondary MOSs with career levels. This area causes a great deal of confusion among 
prospective members ofthe AWF. Table 3.1 illustrates this point by comparing the 
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requirements to become an Acquisition Candidate to the DA WIA requirements to 
become Level I certified in Program Management. 
MOS 9957 Requirements Program Management Career 
Level I Requirements 
- (M) Restricted or Unrestricted Officer - (M) Restricted or Unrestricted Officer 
- (M) Two Years Acquisition Experience - (M) One Year Acquisition Experience 
- (M) A Basic Course in Systems 
Acquisition (ACQ 101) 
-(D) Baccalaureate Degree in Business 
or Technical Discipline 
-(D) An Intermediate Course in Systems 
Acquisition (ACQ 201) 
- (M) =Mandatory Requirement (D)= 
-(D) One Additional Basic Course in Desired but not Mandatory Another POSCA T Requirement 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
Table 3.1. MOS 9957 Versus Program Management Career 
Level I Requirements 
From this table it is easy to see that confusion between the two qualifications 
is not unwarranted. While officers who meet all of the mandatory Career Level I 
requirements are qualified to be members of the A WF, officers with only the 
requirements to become a 9957 do not meet the requirements for AWF membership 
because they lack the required Defense Acquisition University courses to meet the 
minimum training requirements. Conversely, it is entirely possible for an officer to 
be fully Career Level I certified but not be eligible for the 9957 designation because 
of the lack of an additional year of acquisition experience. 
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2. The Acquisition Management Officer 
The next secondary MOS that can be assigned is 9958 or Acquisition Manage-
ment Officer. These are the first level of officers eligible for entry into the APC. 
These officers are at a minimum Career Level II certified. This designation is given 
to both Majors and Lieutenant Colonels that meet Career Level II and III certification 
standards and the four-year experience requirement for APC membership. The 
confusion factor associated with this MOS is not as great as that with the 9957 MOS 
but care still must be taken when trying to equate the MOS with career levels. Table 
3 .2 illustrates why this can be a problem. 
The table shows that while there is a four-year experience requirement for APC 
membership as a 9958 there is only a two-year experience requirement to become 
Level II certified in Program Management as well as all other POSCATS. It is 
therefore possible to be Level II certified and not be eligible for designation as a 9958 
or acceptance into the APC. 
There is another anomaly that becomes readily apparent from viewing Table 
3.2. That is in the area of educational requirements. There is currently no mandatory 
requirement to have attained a Baccalaureate Degree in Program Management or 
many of the other POSCATS in order to become Level II or III certified. A 
Baccalaureate Degree is a requirement for accession into the APC and designation as 
a 9958. This is not necessarily a problem for unrestricted officers, the vast majority 
are accessed into the Marine Corps already possessing this requirement. This could 
pose a problem for restricted officers who for the most part are drawn into the officer 
corps ' from the warrant officer ranks where attaining a degree is not a hard 
requirement. 
3. The Acquisition Manager 
The final MOS that can be assigned to acquisition officers is 9959, which 
carries the title Acquisition Manager. 
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MOS 9958 Requirements Program Management Career 
Level II Requirements 
LEVEL II 
- (M) Restricted or Umestricted Major or - (M) Restricted or Umestricted Major or 
Higher Higher 
- (M) At Least Four Years Acquisition - (M) At Least Two Years Acquisition 
Experience Experience 
- (M) Completion of a Baccalaureate - (M) An Intermediate Course in Systems 
Degree and Acquisition Related Acquisition (ACQ 201) 
Educational Requirements in 
Note 1 -(D) Two Add~tional Years Acquisition 
Experience 
- (M) Completion of Career Level II or 
Higher Acquisition Training -(D) Baccalaureate/Masters Degree in 
Specified by Career Field Engineering, Systems Management 
or Other Related Field 
- (M) Possess a Superior Performance 
Record -(D) One DAU Level 200 Course in 
Another POSCA T 
ADDITIONAL LEVEL III 
REQUIREMENTS 
- (M) Four Years of Acquisition 
Experience 
- (M) Advanced Program Management 
Course (PMT 302) 
-(D) Additional Two Years Acquisition 
Experience 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
Note 1: In addition to the degree requirement, the prospective 9958 must have at least 
24 Semester hours of credit in business disciplines. 
Table 3.2 MOS 9958 Versus Program Management Career 
Levels II & III Requirements 
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This MOS exists only for the career field of Program Management [Ref. 22:p. 
2]. The MOS is used to identify Colonels and Colonel selects that meet all require-
ments for APC membership and all Level III requirements listed in Table 3.2. In 
addition to meeting those stringent requirements the Colonels must have six years of 
acquisition experience. It is desired that the Acquisition Managers have two 
additional years of experience and have completed the Advanced Program 
Management Course (PMT 302) or its functional equivalent at the Defense Systems 
Management College. These are the senior officers destined to become the Marine 
Corps' Acquisition Category I and II (ACAT) Program Managers [Ref. 22:p. 3]. 
4. The Selection Process 
The actual selection process for designation to these MOSs occurs by a formal 
board held yearly at HQMC. An All Marine Message (ALMAR) solicits applications 
normally during March of each year with the actual selection process occurring in 
July. Any restricted or unrestricted officer may apply and be selected for the 9957 or 
9958 in one or more career fields. Since the 9959 MOS exists in only the Program 
Management career field, it would seem at first hand that only Program Management 
designated officers would be eligible to become the senior leadership and managers 
of ACAT I and II programs within the Marine Corps. However, this is not the case. 
The Marine Corps allows Colonels with a background in any of the career fields to 
apply and be selected as an Acquisition Manager if deemed qualified during the 
selection process [Ref. 22:p. 2]. Officers that are not qualified for the 9959 MOS are 
assigned the 9957 or 9958 MOS commensurate with their level of qualification. 
This selection process has occurred annually since 1991. The next section of 
this chapter will look at what level of success the Marine Corps has achieved since 
the first selection board in identifying and staffing their acquisition positions. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF ACQUISITION BILLET IDENTIFICATION AND 
OFFICER ACCESSIONS 
DA WIA mandates that all of the Military Departments identify and report both 
their acquisition positions and critical acquisition positions (CAPs) on a yearly basis. 
Since 1991 the Marine Corps has identified a total of 592 billets involving acquisition 
duties that are required to be filled from the commissioned officer ranks in the grade 
of Captain through Brigadier General. Ofthese billets, 151 at the Lieutenant Colonel 
level or above are designated as CAPs for the Marine Corps [Ref. 21:p. 9]. The 
billets are broken down by rank in Figure 3.1 below. 
Majors 
293 
Total Capt-Col= 591 
* Does not include one Major General position 
Source: [Ref. 6] 
Figure 3.1. USMC Military Acquisition Positions 
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Figure 3 .I is useful in helping gauge the overall size and rank distribution of 
the Marine Corps officer acquisition billets but it does not convey any information as 
to how the billets are distributed among the different acquisition career fields. Figure 
3 .2 provides these data. 
POSCAT Captain Major Lt. Col Colonel TOTAL 
BFM 2 3 2 0 7 
COMM 8 11 0 0 19 
CONT 8 14 0 0 22 
ET&CD 0 0 2 0 2 
LOG 10 15 10 1 36 
M&P 5 1 4 1 11 
PM 65 177 84 30 356 
PMO 0 0 0 1 1 
QA 1 2 1 0 4 
SPRDE 34 39 6 0 79 
T&E 15 31 8 0 54 
TOTAL 148 293 117 33 591 
Source: [Ref. 6] 
*Does not include one Major General in PM 
Figure 3.2. Marine Corps Military Acquisition Positions by 
Rank and Career Field 
The Marine Corps began formally accessing officers to fill these billet 
requirements in 1991. Since that time the Marine Corps has formally certified and 
Source: [Ref. 23] 
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accessed 575 officers into the A WF [Ref. 23:p. 5]. The results of these efforts can be 





Total Capt-Col= 575 
Colonels 
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Figure 3.3. USMC Military A WF Membership 
At first glance it would seem that the Corps has succeeded in filling nearly all 
of their identified positions. A comparison of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 shows that the 
Marine Corps has accessed 575 officers to fill 591 billets and for the most part this 
accession has been at the appropriate grade levels. These graphs can be misleading. 
This would be an appropriate statement if all Marines in the A WF were currently 
serving in acquisition billets. This is not the case however. 
The Marine Corps believes that there is a great deal to be gained by alternating 
its unrestricted officers between billets in their primary military occupational specialty 
(MOS) and acquisition billets. They believe that an acquisition officer with recent 
FMF experience brings to the acquisition billet: 
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A current expert knowledge of the equipment and doctrine used in his 
MOS; 
A first hand field experience to assist with identifying testing require-
ments; 
An understanding for interoperability requirements and how systems 
interface; 
FMF leadership skills to be used for leading teams of civilian and 
military personnel. 
[Ref. 11] 
In general these officers bring current knowledge of Fleet Marine Force (FMF) 
needs with them to the acquisition cycle. The Marine Corps also feels that these 
officers have a unique feel for the Marines in the field that translates into a sense of 
urgency as they fill positions of responsibility and exert influence in the acquisition 
community. [Ref. 11 ] 
The Marine Corps also feels strongly that Marines returning to the FMF after 
an acquisition tour take with them some desirable elements such as: 
Being better in tune with emerging warfighting doctrine and the new 
weapons and employment techniques that will be utilized in employing 
the new doctrine; 
A greater in-depth knowledge of the system engineering than that of an 
end user of the weapon system; 
Being able to incorporate management skills gleaned from the 
acquisition experience into their FMF duties; 
Valuable experience in the joint arena from involvement in joint 
programs; 
37 
And valuable preparation for senior FMF leadership and command 
positions that may use systems fielded during the officer's acquisition 
assignments. 
It is clear that there are definite advantages to the policy of alternating between 
acquisition assignments and FMF duties. However, the policy of alternating between 
FMF assignments and acquisition assignments means that at best, in order to maintain 
proper rotation, approximately half of the Marines accessed into the A WF will 
actually be serving in an acquisition designated billet at any one time. 
There is another factor that further decreases the number of acquisition 
designated Marines that fill acquisition positions. A significant number of Marines 
are in the training, transient, patient and prisoner (T2P2) categories at any given time 
during the year. The largest portion of these T2P2 officers are those currently 
attending Service level schooling (such as Amphibious Warfare School at the 
company grade level or the Marine Corps Command and General Staff College at the 
field grade level). These annual but necessary drains in the pool of officers qualified 
and certified to fill A WF positions requires that the ratio of unrestricted officers 
voluntarily accessed into the A WF to the number of designated acquisition positions 
should be maintained at a 2.5 to 3 to one ratio. This suggests that current officer 
strength ofthe AWF should be in the 1500- 1800 range under ideal circumstances. 
There are two anomalies that become apparent upon deeper inspection of the 
numbers associated with Figures 3.1 through 3.3. The first area of concern deals with 
the physical structure of the acquisition positions. From a manpower standpoint, in 
order to properly staff any MOS it is necessary to have it structured in a classical 
pyramid shape. This recognizes the need for fewer officers as they move through 
their careers and become more senior in rank. However ,in the case of the A WF, the 
present structure is the opposite of this. As a result, presently there are only billets for 
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approximately half the number of captains as for majors. This presents a problem in 
that there is a lack of opportunity for captains to gain the acquisition experience that 
is required to enter the APC as a major. This problem can be reduced to a certain 
extent if the Marine Corps is able to continue accessing enough majors that, through 
their own efforts, have acquired the prerequisite experience required for the A WF. 
But if the pool of qualified applicants begins to dwindle it will be impossible to grow 
enough qualified majors from the eligible pool of captains to fill the number of billets 
in theAWF. 
A second area of interest is the distribution of the acquisition positions among 
the differing career fields. Figure 3.2 shows that the PM career field is by far the 
largest of the career fields within the Marine Corps. It is so large in fact that 60 
percent of the military acquisition billets require an officer with program management 
qualifications. It is even more important to note that 115 ofthe 151, or 76 percent of 
the CAPs within the Marine Corps military A WF, require program management 
experienced officers [Ref. 23:p. 9]. This suggests that the success or failure for the 
Marine Corps A WF hinges on the proper accession and training of highly motivated 
officers to fill these PM positions. 
The next section of this chapter will go into detail on the requirements that 
must be met in order to grow PMs qualified to oversee the Marine Corps acquisition 
programs. 
C. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS 
The legislation that enacted DA WIA also provided a mechanism for those 
affected by the law to receive the prerequisite training in their position categories. 
DA WIA created the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) system to do this. This 
system is a consortium of DOD education and training institutions which provides 
mandatory and assignment specific acquisition courses for personnel serving in the 
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11 acquisition career fields. DAU coordinates the DOD acquisition education and 
training program to meet the training requirements of more than 114,000 military and 
civilians serving in DOD acquisition positions. Through its consortium members, 
DAU provides basic, intermediate, advanced and qualification courses to support the 
professional development of persons in the acquisition workforce. DAU works to 
identify competencies required to perform at various career levels. DAU then 
recommends mandatory training, education and experience requirements in each of 
the functional areas to the Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition and Technology) 
(USD (A&T)). These requirements are published annually along with course 
descriptions in the DAU Course Catalog [Ref. 24]. Members of the acquisition 
workforce who have accumulated a total of ten years of acquisition experience prior 
to 1 October 1991 were "grandfathered" and are not required to meet these DAWIA 
requirements. The current PM requirements in education, experience and training by 
career level are: 
Level I (Captain) 
Education: 
(Desired) Baccalaureate Degree preferably with a major in engineering, 
systems management or business administration 
Experience: 
One year of program management experience 
Training: 
ACQ 101 Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management (9 class days) 
(Desired) ACQ 201 Intermediate Systems Acquisition (20 class days) 
(Desired) One other additional DAU basic level course in another acquisition 
career field. 
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Level II (Major) 
Education: (Desired) 
Master's Degree preferably with a major in engineering, systems management, 
business administration, or a related field 
Experience: 
Two years of acquisition experience, at least one year of which must be in 
program management. 
(Desired) An additional two years of acquisition experience, preferably in a 
systems program office or similar organization. 
Training: 
ACQ 201 Intermediate Systems Acquisition (20 class days) 
(Desired) One DAU intermediate level course in another acquisition career 
field. 
(Desired) Intermediate level management and leadership training. 
Level III (Lt. Col. and above~ 
Education: 
Have ONE of: 
At least 24 semester credit hours from among: accounting, business finance, 
law, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantita-
tive methods, organization and management. 
At least 24 semester credit hours in the individual's career field and 12 
semester credit hours in the disciplines listed above. 
Pass Defense Activity for Nontraditional Education Support (DANTES) or 
College Level Examination Program (CLEP) equivalency exams for above. 
At least 10 years acquisition experience (as of 1 Oct. 91). 
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(Desired) Master's Degree in engineering, systems acquisition management, 
business administration, or related field. 
Experience: 
Four years of acquisition experience, of which at least two years must have 
been in a systems program office. 
(Desired) Two additional years of acquisition experience. 
Training: 
Complete ONE of: 
PMT 301 Program Management Course (97 class days, no longer offered) 
PMT 302 Advanced Program Management ( 67 class days) 
NOTE: All of the DAWIA requirements labeled as "desired" are to be viewed as 
additional requirements that are nice to have but are not currently mandatory. 
It can be seen from even the most casual observation that the requirements for 
the PM position category are very strict and progressive in nature as the individual 
moves up through the three career levels. The requirements for the PM career field 
do not end when an officer becomes Level III certified. The officers that reach this 
level of certification must clear even more hurdles in order to become a PM{~t,Deputy 
PM of a major defense acquisition program (MDAP) or significant non-major defense 
program. A MDAP is generally categorized as a program that will have a total 
expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT &E) of more than 
200 million dollars in fiscal year (FY) 1980 constant dollars, or total expenditures of 
more than one billion in FY 1980 constant dollars. This definition is synonymous 
with ACAT I programs [Ref. 20:p. x]. A significant non-major defense acquisition 
program is the equivalent to an ACAT II program. An ACAT II program is one that 
is estimated to have RDT&E expenditures of more than 75 million constant 1980 
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dollars or an eventual total procurement cost in excess of 300 million dollars [Ref. 
20:p. xii]. 
In order for a Lieutenant Colonel that is Level III certified to become a PM or 
Deputy PM of a significant nonmajor defense acquisition program (ACAT II) the 
officer must possess an additional two years of acquisition experience, for a total of 
six years of experience [Ref. 20:p. A.l-12]. The experience bar is raised another 
notch in order to qualify as a PM or Deputy PM for a MDAP (ACAT 1). The 
prospective officer must accumulate a total of eight years of experience in the acquisi-
tion field to qualify for these positions of responsibility [R~f. 20:p. A.l-13]. 
If this is not enough, the preconditions that must be met to qualify as a 
Program Executive Officer (PEO) require that the PEO hopeful have previously held 
a PM or Deputy PM position and have accumulated ten years of acquisition 
experience [Ref. 20:p. A.l-10]. This is deemed essential because as a PEO a general 
officer will oversee a multitude of ACAT I and II programs worth billions of dollars. 
With these requirements in mind, the challenge for the Marine Corps becomes 
one of creating a systematic way to facilitate a method for significant numbers of 
acquisition officers to receive the required education, training and experience needed 
to eventually staff the CAPs and PM positions within the APC. Dealing with this 
issue is where the Corps is encountering its management difficulties. 
Meeting the educational requirements are generally not a problem for 
unrestricted officers. The vast majority of unrestricted officers are required to possess 
baccalaureate degrees upon receiving their commissions as Marine Officers. 
However, the Corps is currently having difficulties meeting the Level I and II train-
ing and experience requirements necessary to eventually qualify an adequate pool of 
officers to compete for MDAP PM positions. The remainder of this chapter will 
discuss the reason that the Marine Corps is having difficulties with DA WIA mandated 
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training requirements and look for an alternate way for acquisition officers to receive 
the required training. Chapter IV will be devoted to the study of the difficulties 
experienced in fulfilling experience requirements. 
Level I and II mandatory training requirements consist of two DAU courses·: 
Fundamentals of Systems Acquisition Management (ACQ 101) and Intermediate 
Systems Acquisition (ACQ 201) with course lengths of nine days and 20 days 
respectively. These two courses are taught in residence by the Defense Systems 
Management College and the Air Force Institute of Technology. The Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Naval Center for Acquisition Training (NCAT) 
are preparing to offer ACQ 201 in the summer of 1996. ACQ 201 may also be taught 
on-site at the request of major acquisition commands that can demonstrate a need and 
show a cost savings. The Marine Corps currently receives a prorated share of the 
available quotas based on the size of its workforce. The 600 or so military officers 
in the Acquisition Corps is a small fraction of the 114,000 personnel that are involved 
in acquisition throughout DOD. Approximately 92,000 of these DOD acquisition 
personnel require the ACQ 101 and ACQ 201 as part of there mandatory training 
requirements. Correspondingly, the Marine Corps Acquisition Workforce receives 
a very limited number of school quotas. The current requirement for school seats for 
the ACQ 1 01 and 20 1 courses at the Marine Corps Systems Command alone is in the 
range of 150 and 250 seats respectively. The Marine Corps allotment of school seats 
has historically been 30 seats per year for ACQ 101 and 40 seats per year for ACQ 
201. With this small number of school seats available it may be difficult at best to 
satisfy the backlog for these two courses through DAU classes alone [Ref. 25]. If the 
Marine Corps' fair share of quotas for these two classes amounts to only approxi-
mately 30 or 40 class seats per year, what other, if any, avenues are available for 
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Marine officers to receive this training? The next section of this chapter will be 
devoted to answering this question. 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE SPECIAL 
EDUCATION PROGRAM AND THE ACQUISITION CORPS 
The challenge when looking for alternate sources for PM training is to find a 
surrogate that is able to provide training that is recognized as being a suitable 
substitute to the training given in the DAU system. There are currently no civilian 
colleges or universities that offer training in this area that are recognized as having 
suitable substitute courses [Ref. 24 ]. There are however, two DOD schools that are 
DAU certified to provide instruction in the PM subject area. 
The first organization that offers training in this area is the Contracting and 
Acquisition Training Facility located at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. This 
facility offers a very limited amount of training in the PM arena. They only offer 
substitute training for the nine day ACQ 101 course required for the basic Level I 
certification. 
The second DOD organization that offers training directed towards PMs, and 
acquisition professionals in general, is the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) located 
in Monterey, California. Nearly 2,000 students attend NPS. The student body 
consists of officers from the five uniformed Services, 3 7 allied countries and a small 
number of Government civil servants. The school exists: 
For the sole purpose of increasing the combat effectiveness of the Navy 
and Marine Corps. It accomplishes this by providing post-baccalaure-
ate degree and nondegree programs in a variety of subspecialty areas 
not available through other educational institutions. [Ref. 26:p. 7] 
The NPS Department of Systems Management has developed and currently 
teaches a variety of curriculum specifically devoted to the development of the 
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prospective acquisition professional. The first of these curricula IS specifically 
devoted to the professional development of the prospective PM. 
The Systems Acquisition Management curriculum is a seven quarter inter-
disciplinary program designed to integrate business principles, management theory, 
operational and systems analysis and engineering applications tailored to Defense 
acquisition management. The specific academic requirements of the curriculum can 
be viewed in Figure 3.4. 
Quarter Hours Course Title 
Quarter 1 
MN2150 (4-0) Financial Accounting 
MN2031 (4-0) Economic Decision Making 
MN3333 (4-0) Managerial Communication Skills 
MA2300 (5-0) Mathematics for Management 
MN2303 (0-2) Seminar for Program Management Students 
ISOI23 (0-2) Computer Skills Development (as required) 
Quarter 2 
MN3161 (4-0) Management Accounting 
MN3140 (4-0) Microeconomic Theory 
MN3301 (4-0) Systems Acquisition and Program Management 
OS3105 (4-0) Statistical Analysis for Management 
MN2303 (0-2) Seminar for Program Management Students 
Quarter3 
MN3105 (4-0) Organization and Management 
MN3371 (4-0) Contracts Management and Administration 
IS3183 (4-0) Management Information Systems 
OS3006 (4-0) Operations Research for Management Students 
MN2303 (0-2) Seminar for Program Management Students 
Quarter4 
(4-0) Logistics Engineering MN4310 
MN4145 (4-0) Policy Analysis 
MN3309 (4-0) Acquisition ofEmbedded Weapon Systems Software 
MN3154 (4-0) Financial Management in the Armed Forces 
MN2303 (0-2) Seminar for Program Management Students 
Figure 3.4. Systems Acquisition Management Curriculum Requirements 
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Quarter Hours Course Title 
QuarterS 
MN3172 (4-0) Public Policy and Budgeting 
OS3302 (4-0) Quality Assurance and Reliability Methods 
MN4999 (4-0) Curriculum Option 
MN0810 (0-8) Thesis Research 
MN2303 (0-2) Seminar for Program Management Students 
Quarter 6 (4-0) Test and Evaluation OS4601 
NS3252 (4-0) Joint and Maritime Strategic Planning 
E04011 (3-1) Systems Engineering for Acquisition Managers 
MN0810 (0-8) Thesis Research 
MN3311 (1-2) Program Management Exercise 
Quarter7 (4-0) Program Management Policy and Control MN4307 
MN4105 (4-0) Strategic Management 
MN0810 (0-8) Thesis Research 
MN0810 (0-8) Thesis Research 
MN2303 (0-2) Seminar for Program Management Students 
Source: [Ref. 26] 
Figure 3.4 (Continued) 
Successful completion of the NPS course of study is recognized by the DAU 
system as being a comparable substitute to the PMT 301 or PMT 302 courses given 
_by the Defense Systems Management College [Ref. 24:p. D-3]. Completion of this 
curriculum also confers a Master's Degree and gives credit for one year of acquisition 
experience. The successful graduate is fullyLevel III certified in both the education 
and training requirements for Program Management. As an added bonus, the 
graduates of this program also receive equivalency for Level III training 
requirements in the Test and Evaluation career field and Level II training in Systems 
Engineering [Ref. 27]. The Marine Corps presently schedules approximately five 
officers to attend this curriculum each year. A graduate from this curriculum would 
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be qualified from a training perspective to fill 70 percent of the Marine Corps A WF 
billets. 
The second curriculum devoted to training acquisition professionals is the six 
quarter Acquisition and Contract Management curriculum. This curriculum gives the 
officer the Level II contracting requirements and none of the PM or other 
qualifications of the Systems Acquisition Management program. Officers that 
complete this course of study are qualified to fill one of the 22 Marine Corps 
contracting billets. These billets comprise merely 3.6 percent of the Marine A WF 
billets. The Marine Corps schedules approximately seven officers each year to attend 
this curriculum. From a billet staffing viewpoint, an officer graduating from Systems 
Acquisition Management Program is much more versatile for billet assignment and 
would be qualified by virtue ofNPS training to fill 70 percent of the billets identified 
in the Marines' A WF. Given these facts, the Marine Corps may want to reevaluate 
the numbers of officers sent to NPS in these two curricula and the type and amount 
of acquisition training that they recieve. 
A third option exists to give prospective acquisition professionals PM training 
without completing the entire course of academic requirements outlined in Figure 3 .4. 
Successful completion of just two NPS courses can be substituted for the Level I and 
II PM training requirements. Principles of Program Management I (MN3221) and 
Principles of Management II (MN3222) are recognized by the DAU system as being 
fully accredited substitutes for Level I (ACQ 101) and Level II (ACQ 201) DAU 
taught PM courses. These two courses are offered to students in any NPS 
curriculum. Any Marine officer attending NPS may enroll in these classes. 
The Marine Corps currently takes advantage of the educational opportunities 
provided by the NPS by sending 7 5 officers to study one of 18 different curricula each 
year. The different curricula offered are shown in Figure 3.5 along with a breakdown 
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of the number of officers currently studying in each. [Ref. 28] These officers 
volunteer for this duty and are board selected through the Special Education Program 
MOS Name #@ #SEP # Desig % Desig NPS Billets Acq Acq 
9650 Ops Analysis 25 44 4 9 
9658 C-3 7 13 4 31 
9666 Space Syst Ops 4 10 0 0 
9646 Comp Science 23 45 29 64 
9648 ITM 28 67 15 22 
9670 Applied Math 2 3 0 0 
9626 Wpns Syst Eng 2 2 1 50 
9624 Electronics Eng 23 25 20 83 
9666 Space Syst Eng 2 10 0 0 
9634 Electrical Warfare Syst 2 2 0 0 
9620 Aerospace Eng 1 4 0 0 
9656 Contracting 9 21 21 100 
9657 Syst Acq Management 6 5 5 100 
9652 Defense Syst Analysis 9 16 3 19 
9662 Mat Log Management 3 10 3 30 
9644 Financial Management 11 42 2 5 
9640 Manpower Management 13 20 0 0 
TOTAL 170 340 107 31 
Source: Developed by Researcher. 
Figure 3.5. SEP and the A WF 
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(SEP). They are assigned a secondary MOS in the 9600 series for tracking purposes. 
Upon completion of their program of study each officer may not tender his 
resignation for a period of four years and will immediately begin serving a three year 
tour in a billet that has been designated as requiring a graduate level education. These 
billets are affectionately known as "payback" billets among the students at NPS. 
These billets were developed separately and distinctly from the acquisition billets 
included by the Marine Corps in the AWF. However, there is a great deal of 
crossover into acquisition for many of these billets. For example, MOS 9642 which 
is the SEP MOS for an Electronics Systems Engineer, currently has 23 Marine 
officers studying at NPS. There are 25 SEP "payback" billets identified for these 
individuals to fill. Twenty of these 25, or 83 percent of these "payback" billets are 
also identified in the Marine Corps A WF billet structure. 
The amount of overlap between the two classes of billets varies greatly. As 
would be expected, both the Contracting and Systems Acquisition Management 
programs have 100 percent commonalty between the two types of billets. This is in 
stark contrast to some of the more technical programs such as Applied Math and 
Space Systems Engineering which have no commonalty between the two billets. 
Viewed in the aggregate, 107 of340 SEP billets (31 percent) require the individual 
to have at least some acquisition training when reporting for duty. Since 31 percent 
-of all SEP graduates will immediately fill acquisition billets and require subsequent 
acquisition training, (ACQ 101 and ACQ 201) it warrants consideration that some or 
all SEP students receive such training while it is readily available at NPS, rather than 
compete for limited Marine Corps quotas along with the other 94,000 DOD A WF 
members that require these classes . Since there is nearly one third commonalty 
between SEP billets and the A WF, it may be beneficial to use the SEP program as an 
education and training pipeline into the A WF. 
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The next chapter will look at the current non-acquisition career path that 
Marine officers follow and then analyze how the traditional career track would need 
to be modified in order to accommodate an officer who desires to make a career 
choice and enter the Marine A WF. The chapter will also analyze a past effort to have 
institutionalized modifications made to the non-acquisition career track in order to 
accommodate acquisition officers. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF NON-ACQUISITION AND ACQUISITION 
CAREER PATHS 
A. CURRENT NON-ACQUISITION CAREER PATH 
Before this research effort launches into a study and analysis of the current 
acquisition career path, it is necessary to gain a basic understanding of the generic 
non-acquisition career track that most officers use as a guide for career progression. 
It is also important to develop a feel for the underlying principles and constraints that 
govern the makeup of this pathway. In order to properly motivate young officers, it's 
imperative that each officer has the belief that if he or she works hard enough and 
has the proper billet progression, the opportunity to reach the general officer grades 
will be a possibility. This is a primary motive for creating a career path from the 
rank of Second Lieutenant to General. This is not to suggest that there is one typical 
way of becoming a General officer. A reading of ten different general officers' 
biographies will likely indicate there is probably not a "typical" way ofbecoming a 
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general. General officers come from a wide variety of the communities within the 
Marine Corps and have had a wealth of different assignments and experiences during 
their time in the Corps. There are however certain common bricks that are the 
building blocks or cornerstones in every senior officer's pursuit for general officer 
rank. Some of these bricks are mandated by law or statute and others are placed in 
the career path by Marine Corps doctrine and policy. 
There are five prime elements that are related to the makeup of a career path 
in general. The five elements are: promotion flow points, MOS credibility and 
experience, military education and training, joint duty assignments and command 
selection and performance. Figure 4.1 is the typical path that is used as a guide for 
Marine Officers to follow as they progress through their years in the Corps. It 
contains the essence of the five prime elements listed above. 
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Source: Developed by Researcher. 
Figure 4.1. Generic Officer Career Track 
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1. Promotion Flowpoints 
Figure 4.1 shows the current flow points for promotion as triangles along the 
horizontal axis. These desired promotion points are established by DOD and tend to 
be relatively stable in the short run. In the long run the flow points to the grades of 
Major and above can vary by as much as a year. For purposes of this study the 
researcher assumes that the promotion points will not vary enough to have a signifi-
cant impact on the overall career path. 
The figure shows that the newly commissioned Second Lieutenant can expect 
to be promoted to Captain after accumulating two years commissioned service (YCS), 
become a field grade officer at 12 YCS and become a Colonel at about 22 YCS. 
Promotion is by no means automatic. DOD goals for promotion to Major, 
Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel are 70,60 and 50 percent respectively. The remaining 
four elements have a great influence over whether an officer will be considered to be 
competitive for promotion as he approaches each successive promotion point. 
2. MOS Credibility and Experience 
MOS credibility and experience are the foundation of a Marine Officer's career 
and a heavily weighted factor when being screened for promotion. Figure 4.1 shows 
that an optimal non-acquisition career track alternates between tours in the Fleet 
Marine Force (FMF) and periods of assignment to non-FMF duties. These include 
such assignments as recruiting, recruit training and various staff functions that may 
or may not be related to an officer's primary MOS. 
Performance in these duties is just as important as performance in any FMF 
billet. However, since these functions are normally outside the traditional roles of 
Marine combat arms, time spent in these billets tends not to be viewed as valuable to 
an officer's career as similar time spent in an FMF billet. 
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To further illustrate the point, lets look at the case of three fictitious infantry 
Majors coming in zone for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. Major number one has 
spent the previous five years as the operations officer and executive officer of a 
deploying infantry battalion. Major number two also spent a three-year tour as ari 
operations officer within an infantry unit and the remainder of the five years as the 
executive officer of a recruiting district (non-FMF tour). Major number three spent 
the first two years as a Major as a Marine Officer Instructor, training NROTC 
students and then followed that tour with a staff assignment at the Pentagon. Both of 
these are non FMF tours. Assuming that all three Majors received identical fitness 
reports, the nod for promotion would most likely go to Majors number one and two. 
While Major number one has not spent any time in a non-FMF, tour and 
consequently not followed the desired career path, this officer has spent time in 
billets that are institutionalized within the Corps as being " where the rubber meets 
the road." An officer generally will not be penalized for promotion for not serving in 
a non-FMF tour. Major number two has a good balance of both FMF and non-FMF 
experience and will be viewed as having the proper career progression and likely be 
a promotable asset. Major number three however has not spent any time in his MOS 
at his present grade. If selected for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel he would be 
expected to be able to command a battalion of Marine warriors into battle. It is 
doubtful that this individual would be given such opportunity if competing with the 
other two Majors because of a lack of experience and knowledge of the inner 
workings of a Marine battalion as a Major. 
Performance within any assigned billet is more important than the type of 
billet assigned. In the previous example we assumed that each Major had identical 
fitness evaluations. Using the same three Majors and billets assignments the effects 
of varying the levels of performance can be better understood. 
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If Majors number one and two had been evaluated as being "middle of the 
pack" officers as compared to their contemporaries, and the third Major (with only 
non-FMF experience) was consistently head and shoulders above his counterparts the 
promotion outlook could change. Major number three could now be viewed as the 
most promotable within the lot while the promotability of the other two officers may 
be suspect. 
The bottom line in managing billet assignments is that superior performance 
in any billet or set of positions can outweigh any negative connotations that the 
appointment may carry. It is important for any officer to attempt to control 
effectively the type of billets to which they may be assigned, but if dealt a poor hand, 
remember that superior sustained performance is usually the key to promotability. 
3. Military Education and Training 
The next prime element that has a major bearing on career path development 
is military education and training. Each officer, in the course of alternating between 
FMF and non-FMF tours, will attend or be screened to attend four major military 
schools during their careers. 
The basic principle behind these four schools is much the same as the principle 
behind the enactment of the DA WIA legislation for acquisition professionals 
described in Chapter II. DA WIA was an attempt to place the required emphasis on 
the training and experience necessary for individuals to be selected to serve in the 
acquisition corps and better assure their success in their assigned POSCATs. Military 
education and training places the required emphasis on the training and experience 
necessary for officers to succeed in their MOS and prepare them for positions of 
greater responsibility and rank. 
The first school in the hierarchy of these four schools is The Basic School 
(TBS). The name "The Basic School" is an appropriate description of the school's 
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function. It is essentially a six-month elementary education on the functions of the 
Marine Corps and the roles and responsibilities that each officer is expected to fill 
upon assignment to an FMF unit. 
The officers receive a basic level of understanding of small unit tactics and are 
given their first opportunity to lead by assuming leadership positions within the 
student company. The Lieutenants are all drilled with the axiom that "every Marine 
is a rifleman" and is first and foremost expected to be competent in the role of infantry 
officer. Every Marine officer attends this school. Therefore there is no selection 
process involved to choose the attendees. The first level qf military education that 
utilizes a screening and selection board is the Command Level Schools (CLS). 
The CLS Selection board meets yearly to select officers to attend the next 
evolutionary step in the Marine Corps military education system. The board screens 
all eligible Captains and Captain selects to attend this level of schooling based on the 
individual officer's prior performance, career potential, availability for assignment 
and, as always, the needs of the Marine Corps. 
CLS is not a single school, but a consortium of different schools that go 
beyond the elementary education that officers received at TBS. Some of the more 
technical MOSs such as Communications and Intelligence have their own schools 
dedicated to provide this more advanced education. Some of the schools are taught 
by other branches of the military. For example, the Marines currently send a 
significant number of artillery officers to Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, to attend the advanced 
artillery officer course taught by the Army. 
The largest single number of officers attend the Amphibious Warfare School 
(A WS). The school is taught by the Marine Corps, is ten months in length, builds 
upon the information that each officer was taught at TBS, and draws from their 
experiences brought with them from the FMF. In simplest terms, if TBS were an 
58 
elementary level of education on the art of modem warfare, A WS is a secondary or 
collegiate level of instruction. 
Not every Captain is afforded the opportunity to attend a CLS in residence. 
Approximately one third of the eligible officers will attend in residence and the 
remaining officers are expected to complete a comprehensive correspondence course 
that is monitored by the individuals commanding officer. Completion of one of the 
two formats ofthe AWS course is mandatory. 
The next step in the developmental chain that a Marine officer can aspire to is 
the attendance of Intermediate Level Schools (ILS). IfCLS attendance is analogous 
to a collegiate education, ILS is akin to a graduate education. It is so much like a 
graduate education that with successful completion of the Marine Corps Command 
and Staff College and a minimal number of semester hours from a satellite university, 
a Master's Degree may be awarded. 
The selection criteria for the Majors are much the same as that described for 
the Captains attending CLS._ Once again, past performance and further career 
potential are emphasized in the selection process. 
CLS is also a consortium of schools. Marines may be selected to attend the 
Army Command and Staff College, the Air Force Institute of Technology or the 
Naval War College to satisfy ILS requirements. This course is also available by 
correspondence and completion of one of the two forms of the course is a mandatory 
requirement to remain competitive for promotion. 
The pinnacle of the Marine military education system is Top Level Schooling 
(TLS). This is truly the equivalent of a Ph.D. in military studies. The Lieutenant 
Colonels and Colonels ·selected to attend are considered the top of the officer corps. 
Selection for attendance as a Lieutenant Colonel is a significant indicator that 
promotion to colonel will follow. In fact, recent Colonel selection results show that 
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a Leutenant Colonel that had completed TLS had an amazing 90 percent promotion 
opportunity versus a 44.4 percent selection rate for the general population of 
Lieutenant Colonels [Ref. 29]. Selection for the school does not differ significantly 
from the methods and criteria used on any of the other competitive boards. Given the 
promotion rate differential, attendance at a TLS should be something to which every 
Marine Officer aspires. 
It can be seen from this discussion of the Marine Corps education and training 
system that the same "tool box" concept, described for DA WIA mandated training in 
Chapter II, is used to develop Marine officers in the art of modem warfare. Marines 
begin work on building and filling their tool box at TBS and continue the construction 
effort throughout their careers and eventually complete the process upon completion 
ofTLS. 
The next prime element to be discussed will be the importance of successful 
completion of a joint duty tour with one of the non-Department of the Navy Services. 
4. Joint Duty Assignments 
The late 1970's and early 1980's was a time of reflection for the military 
Services and for Congress. It was a time to look for lessons learned from the Vietnam 
conflict and other military actions of that era including the failed Iranian hostage 
rescue attempt. This internal look or self reflection resulted in congressional action 
designed to streamline the way the individual branches of the Service operate in 
military operations that utilize more than one branch of the Service. The major piece 
of legislation to emerge from this internal reflection was the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 [Ref. 30]. One ofthe major 
thrusts of this legislation was to insure that every general officer had the opportunity 
to work closely with his counterparts in the other Services at some time in his career 
after reaching the grade of Captain. 
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The Goldwater-Nichols Act codified this congressional desire into law. The 
Act specifically states that "an officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade 
of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint 
duty assignment" [Ref. 30:p. Sec. 404]. In order for an officer to be designated as a 
joint specialist he must successfully complete an appropriate program at a joint 
professional military education school (ILS) and complete a full three-year tour in a 
joint duty assignment. 
There are three cases when waivers to t4is statute may be obtained from the 
Secretary of Defense or his delegated authority. The first is when it is required for the 
good of the Service. The second is when an officer whose proposed selection for 
promotion is based primarily upon scientific and technical qualifications for which 
joint requirements do not exist. And the last is a blanket waiver for medical and dental 
officers [Ref. 30:Sec. 404]. 
These waiver provisions are limited in their applicability. For all practical 
purposes, any aspiring officer must provide for this assignment when attempting to 
map a promotion path to the general officer grades. 
5. Command Selection and Performance 
The final element that has bearing on career path development is the element 
of selection and successful completion of a period of time spent while holding a major 
command. Major command is defined as battalion level or higher within the combat 
arms fields and squadron level or higher within aviation units. This generally limits 
major command opportunities to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel and above. 
Command screening and selection are often the high water mark of an officer's 
career. The responsibility and accountability for the actions of entire unit can be 
awesome. Therefore, the Marine Corps screens and selects the officers given the 
opportunity of command very carefully and methodically. 
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Not every Leutenant Colonel is afforded the opportunity to command. The 
command screening process begins shortly after the Lieutenant Colonel promotion 
board makes its yearly selections. The command screening board then convenes and 
develops a list of officers that they feel has the necessary prerequisites to lead large 
groups of Marines. This list consists of roughly 50 percent of the officers that 
originally made the cut to Lieutenant Colonel. The list is then compared to the 
number of commands coming available and officers are slated to each command. 
This results in approximately 50 percent ofthe eligible officers that successfully made 
it past the command screening board being slated for command. If the math is carried 
out to the conclusion it becomes evident that only one out of four newly promoted 
Lieutenant Colonels will ever be given the privilege of command. 
The process is virtually identical for the Colonel's command selection process. 
The only noticeable difference is that the size of the command is greater and therefore 
the responsibilities of command are greater in scope. 
The previous discussion shows that there are many wickets to pass through 
along what is deemed to be the generic career path. That may be the very reason that 
there are so few general officers that have followed this path to its conclusion. Figure 
4.1 graphically depicts what demands that each of the five prime elements of a career 
path place upon an officer's time. It is nearly impossible for every officer to follow 
-this career track in its entirety. There are tradeoffs that must be made along the way. 
If an officer's slate is already full, what changes must be made in order to 
accommodate the needs of acquisition officers and the demands of the Marine Corps 
in general? The next section will look at the structure ofthe generic career path as 
acquisition requirements are layered in. 
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B. ACQUISITION CAREER PATH 
The major difference to becoming a general officer in the acquisition corps 
verses a General under the generic career path is the additional requirement of ten 
years of acquisition experience, four of which must have been gained while serving 
in a critical acquisition position. The officer must also continue to meet the three-year 
joint duty assignment levied by Goldwater- Nichols. In all practicality, to be 
competitive for selection, the officer should have attended either ILS or TLS in 
residence and served at least one three-year command or FMF tour as a lieutenant 
Colonel or Colonel. 
These requirements can be easily applied to Majors that have just become 
Level III certified in their career fields with three years of prior acquisition experience 
(e.g., two years of actual experience and one year of credit for education) in order to 
see what affect it might have on their career paths. In order for Majors to meet the 
minimum requirements for selection as a general officer they would require an 
additional 14 years of assignments. They must obtain an additional seven years of 
acquisition experience, a three-year joint tour, one year for either ILS or TLS and 
three years for a command or FMF tour. 
It can be seen in Figure 4.1 that the average time for promotion to Brigadier 
General from Major is 13.5 years. It is simply not possible to fit 14 years' worth of 
assignments into a 13.5-year block of time. One must also remember that ten of the 
14 years are mandated by law (seven years additional acquisition experience and three 
year joint duty assignment). If the Marine Corps decided to pare six months off of the 
four year block of time that it directly controls (ILS, TLS and command or FMF tour), 
the most logical solution would be to eliminate six months of the command or FMF 
tour requirement. This would be a technically feasible solution. There would now 
be 13.5 years of assignments to fit into a 13 .5-year block of time. However, there are 
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still no provisions for alternating between FMF and non-FMF tours. In reality such 
officers could only spend two and one half years in the FMF from the grade ofMajor 
to Brigadier General. This violates one of the basic assumptions laid out at the 
beginning of this study: that the Marine Corps values the experience brought to the 
acquisition process from recent FMF experience and will not discontinue tour 
alternation. It is also doubtful that such officers would remain competitive with his 
contemporaries given the current emphasis placed on MOS credibility by promotion 
boards. 
Unless the Marine Corps is willing to radically alter its views on the 
desirability of having officers with recent FMF experience in the acquisition corps, 
this career track will have a difficult time attracting and retaining the quality officers 
that the Marines Corps requires to fill its acquisition positions. 
Given this situation, how then should the Marine Corps go about developing 
a stimulating and challenging career flow that achieves all the obligatory duty 
requirements needed to keep acquisition officers competitive for promotion? A 
review of previous career path research is in order. 
C. ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS CAREER PATH RESEARCH 
Landmark research in this area was conducted by Colonel Reed T. Bolick 
USMC (Retired) soon after passage of the DA WIA statute and very early in the 
Marine Corps' implementation process in 1992. He recognized that one of the keys 
to answering this question comes in the timing of an officer's first acquisition tour 
[Ref. 31]. 
Figure 4.2 graphically illustrates the direction that he thought that the Marine 
Corps should take when developing a career track for the acquisition corps. The 
culmination of his research effort was the development of two separate but similar 
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B applies to aviation officers. The development of two separate tracks recognizes the 
longer period of time that is required for aviation officers to complete initial flight 
training. Both tracks met the DA WIA requirements that were in place at that time 
[Ref. 31 :p. 34]. 
The postulated paths recognize that both the Marine Corps and the individual 
will have to make some sacrifices in order for the system to work. Instead of being 
available to serve in a variety of non-FMF assignments, an officer electing to be in the 
A WF simply alternates between FMF and acquisition related assignments. The only 
variable in either ofthe paths comes from success or failure for selection to participate 
in the Professional Military Education process. 
As Colonel Bolick showed in path A, a ground officer could attain an advanced 
degree by participating in the Special Education Program (SEP), attend the 
appropriate PME, achieve more than ten years of acquisition experience required for 
selection to General, and still have had the opportunity to be in the FMF at the 
appropriate time to command through the battalion level. This is made possible by 
the officer obtaining acquisition experience early in his career. This enables him to 
get out and remain in front of the experience power curve for the remainder of his 
acquisition career. 
Path B differed from path A in that it did not afford an opportunity for career 
level school and allowed only 18 months to attain an advanced degree. The require-
ment for a Master's Degree at that time was mandated by the Department of the Navy 
and was not a DA WIA or DOD requirement. Colonel Bolick recommended that the 
Marine Corps seek exemption from that added burden. The mandatory requirement 
has since been dropped but is still a "desired" element by DAWIA standards. This 
frees up additional time for additional experience either in the FMF or A WF. 
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While the proposed career pattern fulfilled the requirements of the DAWIA, 
it did not accommodate the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 for 
a joint duty assignment. This was not an inadvertent omission. The reasoning for 
excluding this assignment follows. 
In his February 1989 address to the Joint Session of Congress, President Bush 
announced that he was directing the Secretary of Defense to develop a "plan to 
improve the defense procurement process and management of the Pentagon." Terms 
of reference provided by the president called upon DOD to: 
Develop a plan to accomplish full implementation of the recom-
mendations of the Packard Commission and to realize substantial 
improvement.. .in defense management overall. [Ref. 3 :p. 1] 
This Defense Management Review (DMR) as it became known, examined the 
various efforts to that date to realize the far-reaching improvements envisioned both 
by the Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. They found that while 
there had been progress in implementing the findings and recommendations of these 
two bodies, DOD needed to redouble its efforts. 
Among other things the DMR specifically directed the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments, working with the Service Chiefs, to develop and submit for the 
Secretary of Defense's consideration, plans for establishment of a dedicated corps of 
officers in each Service who will make a full-time career as acquisition specialists. 
They were to identify recommended means to insure: 
Selection of highly promising officers early in their careers; 
Timely specialization in acquisition, including the election of such 
career paths by officers with some significant operational experience; 
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Assignment, other than in exceptional cases, to acquisition positions 
and related training once selected; 
Creation of attractive and equitable career paths, including designation 
of corps-eligible positions; and 
Assurance of promotion potential up to the highest flag grades. 
The resulting Department of the Navy's Plans for Initial Implementation of the 
Defense Management Report responded: 
The ability of the Department of the Navy to implement the plan 
with respect to Unrestricted Line-Material Professional and AM 
Acquisition Material officers is contingent upon a determination by 
the Secretary of Defense to designate such officers as technical 
specialists and thereby waive requirements of current law for 
promotion to flag/general officer. Such a waiver will be necessary 
because of the general impracticability, if not impossibility, of 
providing officers with both the joint experience required by 
statute and the intensive acquisition experience required under the 
plan. [Ref. 32:p. 8] 
On 31 January 1990, the Secretary of the Navy indicated that the Implementa-
tion Plan (containing the above recommendation) had been approved by the Secretary 
of Defense and was to be executed. Colonel Bolick felt that this should provide 
adequate justification for the Marine Corps to seek waivers where necessary. This 
reasoning resulted in his omitting the JDA requirement from his career tracks. 
This chapter has analyzed the difficulties associated with the development of 
a dedicated career path for acquisition designated individuals and looked at one 
proposed solution to the problem. The next chapter will attempt to draw together the 
information provided in the previous two chapters to suggest a comprehensive process 
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for accessing, training and developing a proper career path for acquisition profes-
sionals into a clear and concise campaign plan for action. 
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V. A CAMPAIGN PLAN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE MARINE 
CORPS' AWF 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research in the previous chapters shows that the Marine Corps has had 
some success in growing its fledgling A WF since its beginnings in 1991. The 
research has also answered the four subsidiary research questions posed in Chapter 
I. It has identified the legal statutes and regulations that govern the framework of the 
Marine Corps Officer A WF. The research has explained how the Marine Corps 
currently accesses officers into the A WF. It identified the educational requirements 
that a member of the A WF must meet and finally, it identified alternate educational 
programs that could be utilized to fulfill these educational requirements. 
The successful answering of the four subsidiary research questions now 
enables the researcher to pull together information that was gathered during the 
investigation process and offer a framework or systematic "Campaign Plan" of action 
for the future that will ensure the A WF 's continued viability into the next century 
while answering the primary research question of: 
How can the Marine Corps Acquisition Workforce best be directed 
to ensure a sufficient number of Marine officers are accessed, 
trained and gain the experience necessary to staff the Marine 
Corps' critical acquisition positions? 
The answer to this question is multi-faceted. There is no single suggestion or 
recommendation that may be offered that will adequately answer the primary research 
question. The answer instead, lies in the adoption of a number of suggestions 
disclosed by the research. These recommendations will transform the accession, 
training and experience gaining process into a smooth cohesive system that will offer 
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job satisfaction and unlimited career potential for any officer that chooses to make 
acquisition a career choice. 
1. Redirect Focus from Acquisition Managers to the Bottom of the 
Acquisition Pyramid 
The first change that the Marine Corps needs to make with regard to the A WF 
is primarily one of focus. Up until now the Corps has been primarily concerned with 
the final product of the accession and training process. The final output in this case 
being the fully qualified 9959, Acquisition Manager. This occurred primarily because 
DA WIA requirements were implemented over a relatively short period of time (in 
relation to the amount of time required to fully qualify a 9959) and there was a 
requirement to have fully DA WIA qualified officers identified and in place managing 
the few Marine Corps ACAT I&II programs posthaste. This requirement caused the 
Marine Corps to scan the personnel horizon for officers that, through mostly their own 
efforts, had achieved the proper credentials to assume PM positions. The language 
of the first ALMAR issued to solicit applications for the 9959 MOS reflects this sense 
of urgency when it stated that "The focus of this first board will be on Program 
Managers. Accordingly, it will select only those qualified officers as Acquisition 
Professionals who hold the requisite qualifications to fill billets as Program 
Managers" [Ref. 33p: 1]. The ALMAR did not solicit applications"Ibr APC 
membership to any career field other than Program Management. 
This was an understandable reaction to a short fused requirement. The most 
recent ALMAR on this subject is more balanced and solicits applications for all career 
fields. But the high emphasis placed on attracting and selecting Acquisition Managers 
is still apparent when reading the language of the ALMAR [Ref. 34]. 
The researcher does not suggest that emphasis on selecting the right number 
of Acquisition Managers is unwarranted. After all, the whole purpose of the DA WIA 
statute was to ensure that only the most highly qualified individuals attain these senior 
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positions. The research indicates however that more attention needs to be paid to the 
bottom of the A WF pyramid. Figure 3.1 showed that the bottom of the A WF 
structure is too restricted to allow the proper number of captains to gain the necessary 
experience required for APC membership as a Major. Using the historical promotion 
rate of 70 percent from Captain to Major, this indicates that approximately 420 
officers needed to gain acquisition experience as Captains in order to properly staff 
the 293 Majors' billets of the A WF. More attention needs to be focused on methods 
of broadening this base. The A WF structure is very analogous to a salmon run. In 
order to ensure the survival of the species, make sure that enough enter the cycle in 
the beginning. If large numbers enter, there will most certainly be enough survivors 
at the end of the journey to ensure their future viability. The remaining recommenda-
tions will be geared toward broadening the base of the A WF pyramid and identifY 
methods to make A WF membership more attractive. 
2. Acquisition MOS Realignment with Career Level Qualifications 
The research also indicated that there is room for a great deal of confusion 
between the 9957, 9958 and 9958 MOSs and Career Level qualifications. It would 
be beneficial to reduce this confusion by aligning the MOSs more closely with Career 
Level attainment. One recommended alignment alternative would be as follows. 
The 9957 MOS should be opened up to any Captain or Captain select possess-
Ing a Bachelor's Degree regardless of previous acquisition experience or training. 
The bachelor's degree requirement is intent upon screening out any restricted officers 
who have not attained a degree and would be ineligible for APC membership as a 
Major. The MOS would be used to identity officers who have the desire to work in 
the acquisition community. The MOS should also include individuals that have 
acquired Level I certification in any career field. Under this realignment not every 
9957 would be immediately eligible for A WF membership. But every Career Level 
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I certified officer would be a 9957, eliminating half of the confusion associated with 
this MOS. Since the 9957 designation is not part of the APC or governed by the 
DA WIA statute, the Marine Corps could solicit applications and voluntarily or 
involuntarily select individuals subsequent to the yearly Captain's selection board. 
These officers would then be assigned to one of the 148 Captains' billets shown in 
Figure 3.1 for their first non-FMF tour of duty. These 148 Captain's billets would 
truly become the developmental acquisition billets for the Marine Corps. An officer 
should remain in this developmental billet for a period of two years as shown in 
Figure 5.1. The goal of this assignment period should be to attain Level I 
certification. The shorter than normal two-year assignment, versus three to four years 
for FMF tours, would allow more officers to gain experience and increase effectively 
the number of experienced officers available to fill the 293 Majors' billets without a 
corresponding increase in billet structure. This change would help toward alleviating 
the inverted pyramid design ofthe Marine A WF. Such assignment would also benefit 
the Marine Corps by giving a_ significant number of officers acquisition experience 
early in their careers. This would provide an early start towards the ten years of 
experience necessary to become a PEO as a general officer. 
The 9958 MOS or Acquisition Management Officer designation would remain 
much the same as it is currently. A 9958 would still be required to possess Level II 
certification and meet the four-year experience requirement for APC membership. 
The 9957 realignment would reduce some confusion. For instance, the officers that 
previously would have found themselves ineligible for APC membership at this stage 
of their acquisition careers because of not having a Baccalaureate Degree, would 
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Source: Developed by Researcher. 
Figure 5.1. Recommended Acquisition Officer Career Track 
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The 9959 MOS, or Acquisition Manager title, would be reserved for officers who 
meet all the requirements for Career Level III certification and the additional 
requirements to fill a Critical Acquisition Position as explained in section C of 
Chapter III. The title should be changed to Acquisition Professional to recognize that 
a 9959 could come from any one ofthe DAWIA approved career fields, not only the 
PM career field as in the past. This change is recommended partially to eliminate the 
confusion between being Career Level III certified and meeting the requirements for 
ACAT I&II Program Manager duties. This change also helps to shift some of the 
focus away from the top of the acquisition hierarchy, and r~directs the focus toward 
developing the large body of acquisition professionals from all of the position 
categories and ensures that an elitest or "all animals are created equal, but some are 
more equal than others" mentality does not prevail within the acquisition community. 
Another shortfall discovered is that there is little value added to using the 9959 MOS 
as a tracking mechanism to identify officers qualified to manage ACAT I and II 
programs. The Marine Corps currently has a total of two ACAT I and II programs to 
manage. The vast majority ofMarine Corps programs fall into the ACAT III and IV 
category which may be headed by an individual that meets the· critical acquisition 
position requirements [Ref. 35]. If the 9959 MOS is to be used as a tracking tool it 
would be much more effective to have the MOS attached to the larger body of officers 
qualified to manage the greater number of ACAT III and IV programs rather than the 
two ACAT I and II programs. 
3. Cultivating the Special Education Program 
This recommendation focuses on having the Special Education Program 
become a primary training source for acquisition professionals. The Marine Corps 
has accessed 575 individuals into the A WF. This has worked relatively well. But, in 
order to further increase the number of officers that are qualified for APC 
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membership, additional sources must be found and utilized. The SEP is an ideal 
breeding ground for such officers .. 
The Marine Corps has total control over this program and can modify entrance 
requirements to fit its needs. The Marine Corps could make acceptance to this 
program and assignment to NPS contingent upon officers agreeing to become an 
A WF and APC member when qualified. Precedent for these types of agreements has 
already been set within the Marine Corps. The Aviation community currently 
requires this agreement from the pilots that it selects to attend Test Pilot School [Ref. 
36]. 
Every officer that attends NPS could be required to complete the core program 
management curriculum which consists of Principles of Program Management I 
(MN3221) and Principles of Program Management II (MN3222). This will give the 
Marine Corps 7 5 extra Marine officers per year that have completed Level II PM 
training requirements. This could very easily be accomplished in one of three ways 
depending on the SEP officer's current curriculum. 
The five officers per year that currently attend the Systems Acquisition 
Management curriculum and are subsequently assigned the 9657 SEP MOS would 
require no changes to be made in their studies. They would attain all Career Level III 
training requirements in the PM and Test and Evaluation career fields along with 
Career Level II training in Systems Engineering during their normal course of studies. 
The seven officers per year that attend the Acquisition and Contract 
Management curriculum could continue their studies towards becoming contracting 
officers and the 9656 SEP MOS, but could be required to add the core PM classes to 
their course work. This will not require any additional length in their assignment at 
NPS. Most of the officers chosen for this curriculum have attended some classes as 
an undergraduate that are similar or duplicated in their first two quarters of study at 
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NPS. Based on their past performance in these classes and upon the recommenda-
tions of their professors and Academic Associate they are excused from duplicating 
this coursework at NPS. This leaves adequate room in their schedules to add the two 
core PM classes. The successful graduate would then have both the Level II training 
requirements in contracting and program management. These officers would be 
capable of filling 70 percent of the billets in the Marine Corps AWF rather than the 
3.6 percent if only taught the contracting curriculum. More importantly, these officers 
would have a much more viable career path within the A WF. Currently there are only 
22 billets for these contracting officers throughout the Marine Corps. None of these 
22 billets require an officer above the grade of Major or above Career Level II 
certification in contracting. In all likelihood, a graduate of the Acquisition and 
Contract Management curriculum will do only one three-year payback tour as a 
contracting officer and never return to the contracting field because no billets 
currently exist for them to fill at the Lieutenant Colonel level. This effectively ends 
their contracting careers. Under the proposed change these officers could continue 
their acquisition careers by moving into the PM career field after their initial tour in 
contracting. The individual officer benifits by having increased career potential. The 
Marine Corps benefits by having an increased number of school trained officers 
capable of handling PM responsibilities that also have an intimate knowledge of the 
contracting process. 
The Marine officers in the remainder of the SEP MOSs could also be required 
to add the two core PM courses to their NPS studies. Many of these officers also 
receive credit for their undergraduate studies that opens room in their schedules for 
these two classes. Granted, there may occasionally be an officer without a previous 
background in their course work that will require an extra period of time to complete 
these classes. This may cause some resistance from their SEP Occupational Field 
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Sponsors who are anxious to put these officers to work in their newly acquired SEP 
skills. The sponsors must realize that by allowing their SEP students to attend the PM 
core classes while at NPS they will have them available for their whole three year 
SEP payback tour. The 31 percent of SEP graduates who are destined for acquisition 
designated payback tours would not have to vacate their billets within the first 18 
months to attend the PM core courses once they reach the FMF. More importantly, 
the Marine Corps would not have to compete with the 94,000 other DOD A WF 
personnel that require these limited school quotas. 
Ifthe above recommendations are adopted, the Marine Corps could then assign 
the 9957 MOS to all officers that are chosen for the SEP immediately after their 
selection. They would meet all of the the criteria described earlier in this chapter for 
the realigned 9957 MOS. The SEP students would have shown an interest in 
acquisition by virtue of applying to the SEP program, will receive the Career Level 
II, or above, program management training requirements during their coursework at 
NPS. Even more importantly they will also receive credit for one year of acquisition 
experience by virtue of pursuing an acquisition related education while at NPS. 
The SEP program could also be used to incentivize A WF membership by 
giving first opportunity to attend NPS to officers that have shown a commitment to 
acquisition by having voluntarily been assigned the 9957 MOS and completing a two-
year developmental acquisition tour. This tour could follow the Marine's second 
FMF tour and would fit well with the Marine Corps' desires to rotate between FMF 
and non-FMF tours as depicted in Figure 5.1. SEP trained officers could still 
complete a required payback tour in their area of acquired expertise after completing 
studies at NPS while 31 percent of the officers would gain an additional three years 
worth of acquisition experience. This would be in addition to the two years of 
acquisition experience gained in the developmental acquisition tour. Institutionally, 
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the Marine Corps could also help make this process more attractive to young 
company grade officers by officially recognizing SEP training as an equal substitute 
for CLS and officially adding it to the consortium list. 
4. Create an Acquisition Career Path 
The final major recommendation is for the development and implementation 
of a comprehensive acquisition career path. Figure 5.1 is a recommendation of how 
such a career path should be shaped. It is based on the previous work conducted by 
Colonel Bolick [Ref. 30] and incorporates the ramifications of the recommended 
changes discussed up to this point in the chapter. There are separate paths for both 
aviation and ground officers. There are several differences between the two paths. 
The first is a longer initial MOS training period for aviation officers that recognizes 
the lengthy demands of flight school. The second difference is a slightly longer first 
FMF tour to help reinforce initial flight skills prior to leaving the cockpit for a two-
year developmental acquisition position. The overall effect of these two changes is 
to remove any slack from an aviator's career path. As shown in Figure 5.1 there is no 
period of slack or time that may be used to suit any purpose in an aviator's career 
track as compared with the proposed ground officer's career path. A ground officer 
would encounter a two year time period at around the 22 year mark of the officer's 
career that could be used to complete any career requirements that have not been 
previously met. The aviator does not have the same luxury. The aviator's tours 
subsequent to the first FMF assignment are delayed in relation to those of a ground 
officer because of the longer initial FMF tour. The proposed paths would make it 
possible for both officers to achieve and maintain MOS credibility by alternating 
between FMF and non-FMF tours. Each officer has the opportunity for SEP or CLS 
attendance followed by a SEP payback tour or acquisition tour, whichever is 
appropriate. In either case the acquisition officers are able to accumulate up to six 
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years of acquisition experience and will be eligible for APC membership as a Major. 
Front-loading the acquisition experience early in officers' careers frees them to be 
able to attend one, if not both ILS and TLS later in their careers. More significantly, 
it allows for a period of command. 
The officers are also able to hold a developmental acquisition position, a 
mid-level acquisition position and a critical acquisition position as they climb the 
career ladder. This natural progression is in keeping with the building block approach 
designed into the DA WIA statute. It is also important because a tour in a critical 
acquisition position is required for PEO eligibility later in a. general officer's career. 
The four-year critical acquisition assignment also boosts the officer's overall 
acquisition experience to the magical ten years required for PEO status. 
It should be noted that this career track has not made accommodations for a 
joint duty assignment. The research indicates that there is ample ground to seek a 
blanket exemption from this requirement. It is recommended that in order to further 
justify the designation of acquisition professionals as technical specialists that this 
exemption only be sought for those officers with the highest acquisition credentials, 
those being the new Acquisition Managers or 9959s. Each of these officers will have 
at a minimum, six years of acquisition experience, based on the proposed career 
profile and be Level III certified in their career field. More importantly, they will also 
be fully qualified to hold a post of great responsibility within the acquisition process, 
that being a critical acquisition position. With these credentials, and the research 
presented on the implementation of DA WIA and DMR presented in the previous 
chapter, a waiver on the grounds ofbeing a technical specialist should not be difficult 
to justify. 
It may be argued that tying the joint duty waiver to the new 9959 designation 
is unfair or detrimental to those officers that do not eventually meet the qualifications 
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for 9959 designation. This is a moot point because one of the requirements that must 
be met in order to become a PEO or general officer in acquisition is a period of time 
spent in a critical acquisition position. The officers that fail to qualify as 9959s also 
fail to meet the requirements to be assigned to a critical acquisition position. That 
fact, not the lack of a joint duty waiver will be their disqualification for general officer 
status. 
Figure 5.1 shows that it is physically possible to create a career option that, 
while recognizing the needs of the acquisition corps, allows those interested officers 
to remain viable in their primary MOS. The proposed career track is not a panacea. 
Not every officer will be able to follow it every step of the way. That is not the 
intended goal of a career track. It is merely a graphical way to portray to interested 
officers that the possibility exists for them to pursue a career in acquisition from 
Lieutenant to General without running into a dead-end stream along the way. 
Hopefully official adoption of such a career track would serve to entice enough 
interested individuals into the acquisition structure and ensure enough qualified 
officers survive to become an Acquisition Manager and possibly a PEO for Marine 
Corps systems. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION ANSWERED 
This study has shown that although the Marine Corps' A WF has been 
successfully implemented and initially meets the requirements of the DAWIA statute 
there is a great deal of room for improvement. The Marine Corps can best direct the 
A WF and ensure that a sufficient number of Marine officers are accessed, trained and 
gain the experience necessary to staff the A WF by adopting one or all of the three 
broad recommendations expounded in the previous section of this chapter. The 
Marine Corps should redirect some of the focus away from the top of the acquisition 
hierarchy and place more emphasis on directing a larger number of motivated officers 
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into the bottom of the A WF structure. The Marine Corps should realign its MOS 
system to more closely approximate the existing Career Level structure created under 
DA WIA legislation. Finally, the Marine Corps should officially designate the Naval 
Postgraduate School as a key source to accomplish the education and training 
requirements for the A WF while continuing to access officers through the current 
system. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
It has been shown that the Marine Corps has had some success in attracting 
military officers into the A WF. However, the number of officers required to man the 
A WF far exceeds the current number of volunteers. The Marine Corps should be able 
to alleviate this problem by using the SEP program as a conduit into the A WF while 
continuing to access officers through normal channels. 
The Marine Corps should realign its acquisition MOS structure to more closely 
match Career Level certification and open the 9957 MOS to all individuals that take 
an active interest in acquisition. It should also assign this MOS to all Marine Officers 
that volunteer for SEP training. 
The Marine Corps could also increase the number of majors that qualify for 
APC entry by giving prospective 9957s a two year developmental acquisjtjon tour 
early in their careers. 
Finally, it is possible to develop an acquisition career path that can ensure 
continued MOS credibility and develop acquisition officers sufficiently enough to be 
effective Program Managers and meet all DA WIA requirements to qualify them for 
the general officer positions within the A WF. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A brief discussion of two additional areas that were beyond the scope of this 
study could be considered for future study follows. 
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There are currently 22 contracting billets within the Marine Corps, 100 percent 
of these billets are designated as acquisition positions. The Marine Corps has 
deemed it important for the officers that occupy these billets to have a graduate 
education. In order to accomplish the required DA WIA and graduate training the 
Marine Corps, through the SEP program, sends seven officers per year to NPS . Since 
DAWIA implementation, the Marine Corps has identified 356 program management 
billets as acquisition positions. The Marine Corps has identified less than ten of these 
to be filled with acquisition professionals that possess graduate education. A study 
to identify the PM positions that would benefit from the assignment of acquisition 
professionals with the wide variety of graduate education backgrounds gained through 
participation in the SEP could show the Marine Corps where to place the SEP 
graduates that may be accessed into the A WF through the adoption of the proposed 
recommendations of this study. 
A second area that may be of interest for a follow-on study would be to 
determine where SEP educated contracting officers (qualified at Level Ill) could be 
placed at the Marine Corps Systems Command. There are currently no positions 
available for SEP officers at the command that procures all of the Marine Corps 
ground weapon systems. This area for further research is suggested to take 
advantage of the training and expertise of the contracting officers that could be 
accessed into the A WF through the implementation of the recommendations in this 
study. If the Marine Corps implements these recommendations and continues to train 
at the present rate of seven contracting officers per year there would soon be more 
than the 22 contracting officers required to fill the current billets. While these officers 
will be able to serve subsequent tours in either contracting or program management 
positions by virtue of their SEP training, it may make sense to involve these second 
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tour contracting officers in the contracting process and glean from them some of the 
FMF experiences that the Marine Corps values in the acquisition process. 
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